Daniel Bochsler

University of Zurich / Zentrum für Demokratie Aarau

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Conference outline

“Ethnic Politics and Electoral Democracy”

Zurich, 14-16 June, 2012

Part I of Collaborative Workshops on Ethnic Politics and Electoral Democracy: Zurich (June 2012) and New York (October 2012).
Sponsored by NCCR Democracy & Centre for Comparative and International Studies (CIS), University of Zurich, and the Center for the Study of Democracy, University of California, Irvine

Principal organizers:
Bernard Grofman, Director, Center for the Study of Democracy, University of California, Irvine
Daniel Bochsler, NCCR Democracy, University of Zurich

Providing political integration in multi-ethnic societies is one of the pressing issues of democratic governance in the 21st century. Over a half-century ago, a distinguished American political scientist, E.E. Schattschneider said that to speak of democracy and political representation is “to speak of political parties”. In the proposed conferences, we plan on combining the themes of civic inclusion and the study of the ethnic basis of political party organization within the widen rubric of ethnic conflict resolution. When ethnic divides serve as focal points for political division, we may see ethnically based political parties and/or parties that seek to bridge ethnic divisions in the society (Horowitz, 1985, Birnir, 2007, Chandra, 2004, Chandra, 2005, Van Cott, 2005, Norris, 2004: 209-229) . However, multi-ethnic parties re­main rare in divided societies, while they are much more common in plural societies, where ethnicity plays a weaker role in setting the course of political competition (Nordlinger, 1972, Horowitz, 1985, Grofman and Stockwell, 2003).

Research on the links between ethnic politics and electoral democracy has mainly looked at the links between electoral and other institutions and levels of ethnic voting in ethnically diverse societies, on the one hand, and on links between electoral and other institutions and the political stability of these societies on the other. This work has been both empirical and normative. A key normative split has been between the school of power sharing, which advocates proportional representation methods for ethnically divided societies (Lijphart, etc.) and the centripetalist school, which advocates majoritarian rules, notably the alternative vote, that are intended to foster vote pooling across ethnic lines on the part of “moderate” voters. This normative debate has had two empirical components, trying to identify differences in the performance of PR versus majoritarian institutions in terms of moderating ethnic conflicts, and looking at levels of ethnic voting and the bases of party organization under different institutional arrangements.

The starting point of many theoretical models relies on homogeneous preferences of ethnic groups in ethnic conflicts. This assumption, however, has been challenged by others (e.g. Lublin, 1999) who take a more nuanced tone, arguing that the effect of electoral rules on ethnic representation and conflict mediation can be very context dependent. First, voters in multi-ethnic societies have more than just a single-dimensional ethnic identity, and different identities can be activated (Chandra, 2005) . Second, even in a multi-ethnic context, there are other than ethnic issues (e.g. economic issues) that matter for vote choice. Third, even on ethnic issues themselves, there are very different degrees of political radicalization, and the moderates of different ethnic groups might have more points in common than a moderate and radical of the same ethnic group (Fraenkel and Grofman, 2004) .

In these two workshops we aim at bringing together scholars of diverse theoretical perspectives with knowledge of different regions of the world to seek to provide a new insights and potential synthesis. The workshop especially seeks work that looks at questions such as the following:

  • Which models of institutional engineering are best for multi-ethnic or post-conflict societies? Are there new models of electoral engineering for multi-ethnic societies, and which goals do they aim at?
  • Which factors explain political radicalization and the (non-)success of ethnically radical political parties in multi-ethnic societies?
  • When do multi-ethnic political parties and multi-ethnic coalitions (electoral coalitions, governing coalitions) emerge?
  • What are the consequences of bans on ethnically defined political parties?
  • What drives political unity or internal splits of ethnic groups? How do intra-group divides affect intra-ethnic electoral competition, radicalisation and/or prospects of inter-ethnic cooperation?
  • How can ethnicity be measured quantitatively and how are identities affected by ethnic politics?
  • Which are the implications of political representation in multi-ethnic societies for related research fields, such as ethnic conflict, or the protection of ethnic minority rights?

References (partial)

Birnir, J. K. (2007). Ethnicity and Electoral Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Chandra, K. (2004). Why Ethnic Parties Succeed. Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Chandra, K. (2005). Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability. Perspectives on Politics 3(2): 235-252. Fraenkel, J. & Grofman, B. (2004). A neo-Downsian model of the alternative vote as a mechanism for mitigating ethnic conflict in plural societies. Public Choice 121(3-4): 487-506.
Grofman, B. & Stockwell, R. (2003). Institutional design in plural societies: Mitigating ethnic conflict and fostering stable democracy IN Mudambi, R., Navarra, P., Sobbrio, G., Mudambi, R., Navarra, P. & Sobrio, G. (eds.) Economic welfare, international business and global institutional change. Cheltenham, Elgar.
Horowitz, D. L. (1985). Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, University of California Press.
Lublin, D. (1999). Racial Redistricting and African-American Representation. A Critique of "Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?". American Political Science Review 93(1): 183-186.
Nordlinger, E. A. (1972). Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies, Cambridge (MA), Harvard University, Center for International Affairs.
Norris, P. (2004). Electoral Engineering. Voting Rules and Political Behaviour, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Van Cott, D. L. (2005). From Movements to Parties in Latin America: The Evolution of Ethnic Politics, New York, Cambridge University Press.

Conference contact: ethnicpolitics add ipz.uzh.ch

 

Call for papers

Paper proposals should be sent by 15 August 2011 to ethnicpolitics add ipz.uzh.ch. Proposals should contain a title and an abstract (200-400 words), containing short information about the research question, the envisaged theoretical model, research design, and expected results. Please also provide full contact information and short bio (50-100 words). A limited number of papers will be selected to be presented at the conference. Authors will be notified by the end of September 2011.

Full funding is available for a limited number of paper givers (with preference for European scholars, due to travel costs).
  Last update: 20 June 2011